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Setting the World Right
A B ST R ACT. Five years after September 11, 2001, America's response to that traumatic day
has effectively turned the world of American public law upside down. Claiming that a global
war on terror calls for an entirely new legal paradigm, the Bush Administration and its
supporters have pressed for a revamped constitutional and international vision that
champions the supremacy of both executive and American unilateralism. Recently, executive
power advocates have even begun to claim that in a crisis, executive action validates itself. This
Essay reviews this cycle of history and argument and describes what impels executive power in
this direction. The Essay argues that the United States Supreme Court's landmark opinion in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld has begun setting the world of public law right and explains how Hamdan
undermines scholarly claims of those who still urge the need for enhanced executive authority in
national security affairs.
AUTHOR. Dean and Gerard C. & Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law, Yale
Law School; Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 1998-2ool.
This Essay derives from remarks delivered at The Yale Law Journal's 20o6 Symposium on
Executive Power; the 2006 Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute; and the Yale Law
School American Constitution Society 2005 Conference on "The Constitution in 2020"; and my
remarks before the Senate Judiciary Committee on July 11, 2006. I should disclose that I served
as Counsel of Record for Amici Curiae Madeleine K. Albright and 21 Former Senior U.S.
Diplomats in Support of Petitioner Salim Ahmed Hamdan in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. I was also a
member of the ABA Task Force on Presidential Signing Statements and the Separation of Powers
Doctrine, referenced at note 76. I am grateful to Kate Desormeau and Judy Coleman of Yale Law
School for outstanding research assistance.
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In an uncertain world, crisis demands executive action. And so it was that
2005, a year of crises ranging from Hurricane Katrina to the global war on
terror, became a year of executive muscle-flexing. Lost in the turmoil was a
public awareness that in just five years, the war on terror had turned the world
of public law upside down. As that conflict drags into its sixth year, a perceived
need for executive flexibility in fighting terrorism has triggered both exorbitant
governmental claims of executive power and a growing stream of scholarship
supporting the expansion of executive discretion to address the war on terror.'
But as the Supreme Court's October 2005 Term ended, the Court issued a
landmark ruling in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld? which has - one might hope - finally
begun the much-needed process of turning the legal world right-side up again.
This Essay examines how the world of law turned upside down, how some
scholarly efforts -exemplified by two academic proposals found elsewhere in
this Issue -lend support to that misbegotten exercise, and how Hamdan offers
principles that can set the legal world aright again.
I. FLIP-FLOP
If the Age of Globalization began in November 1989 with the collapse of
one structure, the Berlin Wall, the texture of that age changed dramatically on
September 11, 2001, with the collapse of a second, the Twin Towers.3 The
collapse of the towers - and America's response to it - moved us almost literally
out of the light and into the shadows of the Age of Globalization.
During the first phase of the Global Era, from 1989 to 2OOl, the world
marveled at the possibilities of global travel, global communications, and
global markets. We could communicate with anyone, anywhere in the world,
by e-mail or cell phone, withdraw currency from foreign bank machines, travel
anywhere at a moment's notice. But in the wake of September 11, we realized
with horror that those same tools of globalization could be turned against us:
Mail could be used to send anthrax, global commercial transactions could be
used to finance terrorist operations, and the very planes that could fly us
around the world could be used to kill thousands and destroy our most iconic
buildings.
1. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President's Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J.
2280 (2006); Jide Nzelibe & John Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional Design, 115 YALE L.J.
2512 (2006).
2. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (20o6).
3. My colleague, Yale History Professor John Lewis Gaddis, first brought this juxtaposition to
my attention.
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How did this recognition affect America's vision of foreign policy and law?
In the late twentieth century, U.S. foreign policy had been characterized by
four features. First, our policy emphasized the importance of using diplomacy
backed by force only as a last resort.4 Second, we followed a human rights
policy based on universal application of the principles of Franklin Delano
Roosevelt's 1941 "Four Freedoms" speech (freedom of speech, freedom of
religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear). 5 Third, U.S. democracy-
promotion policy focused on building democracy from the bottom up.6 Finally,
we followed a diplomatic approach best described as "strategic multilateralism
and tactical unilateralism."7
Remarkably, in just five years, the Bush Administration has responded to
September 11 by turning each of those four ideas on its head. Instead of
diplomacy backed by force, the adventures in Afghanistan and Iraq exemplify a
policy offorce first, where ad hoc "coalitions of the willing" preserve homeland
security through discretionary warmaking on real and potential state sponsors
of terror-justified by an international law theory of preemptive self-defense
and fear of access to weapons of mass destruction.8 The main constraint on this
strategy is not so much international law as the limits imposed by our finite
military and economic resources. Second, recent human rights policy has
rejected universalism and international criminal adjudication in favor of a Cold
War-style double standard. We now downplay torture and violations of the
Geneva Conventions committed by ourselves or our allies as necessary
elements of the war on terror, claiming that freedom from fear is now the
overriding human rights value.9 Third, we have shifted from bottom-up
democracy promotion to top-down, militarily imposed democracy promotion
in Afghanistan and Iraq, coupled with soft faith in "domino democratization"
throughout the Middle East and reduced democracy promotion in Central and
Eastern Europe (Ukraine), Africa (C6te d'Ivoire), Latin America (Venezuela),
4. See, e.g., MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, MADAM SECRETARY 354 (2003).
5- President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Eighth Annual Message to Congress (Jan. 6, 1941),
reprinted in 3 THE STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1790-1966, at 2855
(Fred L. Israel ed., 1966).
6. See, e.g., President Ronald Reagan, Address to Members of Parliament, 18 WEEKLY Comv.
PRES. DOC. 764 (June 8, 1982). For historical background, see THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING
DEMOCRACY ABROAD: THE LEARNING CURVE 30-32 (1999); and Harold Hongju Koh, A
United States Human Rights Policy for the 21St Century, 46 ST. Louis U. L.J. 293 (2002).
7. 1 owe this observation to former Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. See Harold
Hongju Koh, Foreword: On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1499 (2003).
8. See NAT'L SEC. COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA (2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf
9. Koh, supra note 7, at 1498.
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and South Asia (Pakistan). Fourth and finally, America's new diplomatic
strategy emphasizes strategic unilateralism and tactical multilateralism,
characterized by a broad antipathy toward international law and global regime-
building through treaty negotiation. And so we disregard our signature to the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, flout the Kyoto Protocol on
Climate Change, and withdraw from the Optional Protocol of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations.
What does this flip-flop mean for what I called some years ago "The
National Security Constitution"?1 Not surprisingly, this revamped foreign
policy vision-of unfettered executive power in the war on terror, human
rights double standards, militarily imposed democracy, and strategic
unilateralism- cannot operate unless the constitutional vision within which
foreign policy functions is also recast.
In 2001, as a matter of constitutional law, national security policy was
conducted within four widely accepted premises. First, that executive power
operates within a constitutional framework of checks and balances, resting on
the vision of shared institutional powers set forth in Justice Jackson's canonical
concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer." That vision of shared
powers rests on the simple notion that constitutional checks and balances do
not stop at the water's edge. To thrive in a global world, we need an energetic
executive, to be sure, but checked by an energetic Congress and overseen by a
searching judicial branch. Second, that there are no law-free zones, practices,
courts, or persons. 2 Third, that we accept no infringement on our civil liberties
without a clear statement by our elected representatives.1 3 Fourth and finally,
that -except for a few political rights, such as the right to vote or serve on a
io. HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER
THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990).
11. 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). In Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S.
654, 661 (1981), a majority of the Court adopted Justice Jackson's tripartite framework.
12. Cf Hillel Neuer, Aharon Barak's Revolution, http://www.daat.ac.il/DAAT/ezrachut/
english/hillel.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2006) ("[T]he world is filled with law. Every human
behavior is subject to a legal norm .... Wherever there are living human beings, law is
there. There are no areas in life which are outside of law." (quoting, in translation, Aharon
Barak, Judicial Philosophy and Judicial Activism, 17 TEL AVIV U. L. REV. 477,483 (1992))).
13. Under the clear statement doctrine of Kent v. Dulles, 3S7 U.S. 116 (1958), courts must
carefully scrutinize statutes cited by the executive for signs not only that Congress has
consented to the President's actions, but also to determine whether the President and
Congress acting together have made a clear determination to infringe on individual rights.
When individual rights are at stake, courts should "construe narrowly all delegated powers
that curtail or dilute them." Id. at 129; accord Greene v. McElroy, 36o U.S. 474, 507-08
(1959).
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jury -aliens and citizens are treated largely the same, particularly with respect
to economic, social, and cultural rights.1
4
Yet only five years later, this constitutional vision has become similarly
inverted. First, the Bush Administration now asserts a constitutional theory of
unfettered executive power, based on extraordinarily broad interpretations of
the Article II Commander in Chief Clause and the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., which famously called the
President the "sole organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations.""5 According to this vision, the President's Article II powers are
paramount, Congress exercises minimal oversight over executive activity,
government secrecy prevails, and the Solicitor General regularly urges the
courts to give extreme deference to the President, citing the judiciary's "passive
virtues." Second, the Bush Administration rejects human rights universalism in
favor of executive efforts to create law-free zones: extralegal spaces
(Guant~namo), extralegal courts (military commissions), extralegal persons
(enemy combatants), and extralegal practices (extraordinary rendition), all of
which it claims are exempt from judicial review. Understandably, the
administration opposes judicial efforts to incorporate international and foreign
law into domestic legal review so as to insulate the U.S. government from
charges that it is violating universal human rights norms in favor of double
standards. Third, we increasingly hear claims that the executive can infringe on
civil liberties without clear legislative statements, relying on broadly worded
laws such as the Authorization for Use of Military Force of September 200116 to
justify secret National Security Agency surveillance, indefinite detentions, and
torture of foreign detainees." And fourth, the war on terror has exacerbated
14. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) ("[T]he Court's decisions have
established that classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are
inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class are a prime example
of a 'discrete and insular' minority for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is
appropriate.") (internal citations omitted).
15. 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936); KOH, supra note io, at 94 ("Among government attorneys, Justice
Sutherland's lavish description of the president's powers is so often cited that it has come to
be known as the 'Curtiss-Wright, so I'm right cite'- a statement of deference to the president
so sweeping as to be worthy of frequent citation in any government foreign-affairs brief.")
(footnote omitted); see also id. at 93-96 (criticizing the decision).
16. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (codified at 5o
U.S.C. § 1541 note (Supp. III 2003)).
17. See Wartime Executive Power and the National Security Agency's Surveillance Authority 1I:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, iogth Cong. (2006) (statement of Harold
Hongju Koh, Dean, Yale Law School) [hereinafter National Security Agency's Surveillance
Authority 1], available at www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/HHKNSAtestfinal.pdf; Harold
Hongju Koh, A World Without Torture, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 641 (2005).
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already sharp distinctions between citizens and aliens within American society
with respect to political, civil, social, and economic rights. These distinctions
have contributed to pronounced scapegoating of Muslim aliens in American
life and mass public protests over pending immigration legislation.
II. A LAW UNTO ITSELF
The latest twist, which has emerged during the past year, has been the
startling notion that executive action constitutes a law unto itself. The policy
rationale for executive action, the President's defenders now argue, has
somehow created the legal justification for executive unilateralism.
Take, for example, the surprising revelation that the President had ordered
the National Security Agency (NSA) to engage in nearly four years of secret,
warrantless domestic surveillance of uncounted American citizens and
residents, notwithstanding the statutory directive that domestic intelligence
wiretapping be conducted exclusively within the terms of the 1978 Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).'8  The Bush Administration first
vociferously claimed the necessity of wiretapping telephone calls involving al
Qaeda, then ended up asserting that the presidential determination that the
executive action was necessary had not only overridden FISA but also rendered
application of that statute unconstitutional."9 In January 2005, before the NSA
program came to light, when Alberto Gonzales was being confirmed as
Attorney General, Senator Russ Feingold asked him whether he believed the
President could violate existing criminal laws and spy on U.S. citizens without
a warrant. Mr. Gonzales answered that it was impossible to answer questions
concerning a "hypothetical situation," but that it was "not the policy or the
agenda of this president to authorize actions that would be in contravention of
our criminal statutes."2" When questioned about this during later hearings on
NSA surveillance, he answered that he had not misled Congress because once
18. 18 U.S.C. § 25 11(2)(f) (2000).
ig. "The President has determined that the speed and agility required to carry out the NSA
activities successfully could not have been achieved under FISA. Because the President also
has determined that the NSA activities are necessary... FISA would impermissibly interfere
with the President's most solemn constitutional obligation" to defend the country and
therefore would be "unconstitutional as applied." U.S. Dep't of Justice, Legal Authorities
Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the President 34-3S
(Jan. 19, 2006) [hereinafter DOJ White Paper], available at http://www.fas.
org/irp/nsa/dojo119o6.pdf.
;o. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Alberto Gonzales To Be Attorney General of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 116-17 (2005).
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the President had authorized an action it became legal under the President's
constitutional powers and thus could not contravene any criminal statutes."
Or take the debate over torture. In its infamous, now-overruled August
2002 "Torture Opinion," the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel
opined that even criminal prohibitions against torture do "not apply to the
President's detention and interrogation of enemy combatants pursuant to [the
President's] Commander-in-Chief authority," and that "[a]ny effort by
Congress to regulate the interrogation of battlefield combatants would violate
the Constitution's sole vesting of the Commander-in-Chief authority in the
President."' The Opinion further suggested that executive officials can escape
prosecution for torture on the ground that "they were carrying out the
President's Commander-in-Chief powers," reasoning that such orders would
preclude the application of a valid federal criminal statute "to punish officials
for aiding the President in exercising his exclusive constitutional authorities."23
Under intense public pressure, President Bush has now backed off such
extreme claims, recently telling an interviewer, "I don't think a president can
... order torture, for example.... Yes, there are clear red lines ... ,4 But his
actions have been far less resolute than his words. Congress overwhelmingly
enacted the McCain Amendment to the Defense Authorization Act, which
barred the torture of individuals under the "custody or physical control""5 of
U.S. government officials.2 6 But even after the President publicly endorsed the
law, his presidential signing statement made only a qualified commitment to
21. Wartime Executive Power and the National Security Agency's Surveillance Authority: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, lo9th Cong. (20o6) (statement of Alberto Gonzales,
Att'y Gen. of the United States).
22. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to
the President, 35, 39 (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/nation/documents/ dojinterrogationmemo2ooo8ol.pdf; see also id. at 39 ("Congress can
no more interfere with the President's conduct of interrogation of enemy combatants than it
can dictate strategic or tactical decisions on the battlefield.").
23. Id. at 35.
24. CBS Evening News (CBS television broadcast Jan. 27, 20o6), transcript available at
http ://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2oo6/ol/27/eveningnews/mainl248 9 52-page3.shtml.
25. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739 (codified
at 1o U.S.C.A. § 8oi note and 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 20oodd to 20oodd-1 (West Supp. 20o6)).
a6. See Eric Schmitt, President Backs McCain on Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Ai
(reporting that it was a "stinging defeat" for Bush that both chambers had defied his
threatened veto to support McCain's measure resoundingly, especially considering that his
party controlled both houses of Congress).
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follow the new law "in a manner consistent with the President's constitutional
authority to supervise the unitary executive branch."27
How does a well-meaning executive come to make such dangerous
constitutional claims? What now makes the executive the "most dangerous
branch"? The essays in this Symposium meditate upon the nature,
transformation, and limits of executive power at all levels of governance:
national, state, and local; public and private. But what, precisely, is the psyche
of the executive and how does it evolve?
Let me suggest four practical reasons why executives tend to do the things
they do. First, the executive has resources: other people's money-usually a
treasury assembled from a tax base, whether that be local, state, or national
taxpayers or shareholders; information -often classified; staff; various kinds of
hard power, including weapons and troops; and soft power-a bully pulpit,
public visibility, and moral standing.
Second, the executive has a duty both to act and to react, particularly in
emergencies. Because the executive bears both a duty to break eggs and a duty
to respond when eggs are broken, the executive usually has no choice but to
exercise destructive power and to get its hands dirty.
Third, increasingly, our executives live isolated in a bubble of
"groupthink," which breeds a temptation to act alone, sometimes in secret. 8
Executives often find it stunningly more efficient to act alone. It is far easier for
them to respond to crises if they do not take time to talk to others who do not
work for them, who often lack the information the leaders have or do not share
their views. Over time, living inside the bubble encourages executives to
dispense with prior consultation because they begin to find it easier to seek
forgiveness than to ask permission.
Fourth and finally, the executive branch never thinks of itself as dangerous.
Instead, it invariably views itself as beleaguered and put-upon, obliged to
serve, yet underappreciated, under-resourced, and invariably misunderstood
by those who do not recognize its benign motives.
Taken together, these factors help to explain why executive power so often
creates a problem for the law. When executives mix a capability to act with a
duty to react, backed by resources inside a groupthink bubble, they begin to see
the advantages of acting without prior consultation. Over time, a growing
sense of feeling put-upon and misunderstood makes it easier for executive
actors to convince themselves that their actions must have support from some
27. Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, 42
WEEKLY Comp. PREs. Doc. 23 (Jan. 6, 2006).
28. See IRVING L. JANIs, VICTIMs OF GROUPTHINK (1972).
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external source, such as competence, democratic legitimacy, or legal legitimacy.
And so it is that executives begin to confuse the "ought" with the "is." They
come to believe that they exercise executive power because they ought to
exercise executive power, which means they must have some kind of right to
do so, rooted in competence, law, or democracy. From this reasoning, it is just
a short step to the notion that executive power validates itself.
All of which, of course, brings back eerie memories of Richard Nixon's
remark: "[W]hen the president does it, that means that it is not illegal."29 But
perhaps the more telling quote is by Henry Kissinger, who said, "The illegal we
do immediately. The unconstitutional takes a little longer.
30
Upon reflection, Kissinger's words carry an unsettling ring of truth. Why
does the unconstitutional take a little longer? Because even the most expansive
theory of presidential power cannot carry the day unless the checks and
balances against such overreaching prove ineffective. Ironically, the executive
branch usually asserts exorbitant claims of executive authority not at times of
political strength but rather at times of intense political weakness. Weak
executives usually assert unilateral power because they feel unsure that
Congress will endorse or that the courts will ratify what they feel inexorably
pressured by circumstance to do.
Take, for instance, Harry Truman's decision to seize the steel mills during
the unpopular Korean War, Richard Nixon's illegal actions during Watergate,
Ronald Reagan's privatization of foreign policy during the Iran-Contra Affair,
or George W. Bush's recent decision, amid plummeting popularity polls, to
defend NSA domestic wiretapping. In each case, the executive branch asserted
expansive constitutional justifications for unconstitutional actions, but the
public's acceptance of those claims ultimately turned on whether Congress had
acquiesced in or the courts had approved the legality of the President's claims.
In short, the unconstitutional takes longer because it takes all three
branches, not just one, to create a constitutional crisis. When the President
overreaches, he can only remake the law to justify his actions if Congress also
disengages and the courts stay blinkered. In the five years since September ii,
Congress has been remarkably pliant in refusing to stand up to the President's
repeated assertions of unilateral power. But on all three occasions on which the
Supreme Court has ruled on the merits of challenges to claims of presidential
authority since September 11, the Court has set significant limits on those
29. Excerpts from Interview with Nixon About Domestic Effects of Indochina War, N.Y. TIMES, May
20, 1977, at A16.
3o. DuPre Jones, The Sayings of Secretary Henry, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1973, § 6 (Magazine), at
91.
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claims.3' Happily, Justice Stevens's recent landmark opinion in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld may signal that the pendulum is finally swinging away from
institutional acquiescence in executive overreaching.
III. HAMDAN
Hamdan arose, according to one press account, from a presidential order
that was issued without the knowledge or consultation of the Secretary of
State, the National Security Advisor or her legal counsel, the General Counsel
of the CIA, the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, or any of
the top lawyers in the military's Judge Advocate General (JAG) Corps.32 In
November 2001, President Bush issued a Military Order, without congressional
authorization or consultation, which declared that "[t]o protect the United
States and its citizens.., it is necessary for [alien enemy combatants] .. to be
tried for violations of the laws of war and other applicable laws by military
tribunals."33 Although that decision triggered public outcry,' Salim Ahmed
Hamdan, alleged once to have been Osama bin Laden's driver, was soon
charged with the nebulous crime of "conspiracy. to commit offenses triable
by a military commission."" By the time his case finally arrived at the Supreme
Court, the Bush Administration had embedded into its legal argumentation
each of the elements of its extreme constitutional vision.
31. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004);
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). A fourth post-9/ll case, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S.
426 (2004), did not rule on the merits of a detainee's habeas petition but merely specified
the jurisdiction in which the habeas petition could be heard.
32. Jane Mayer, The Hidden Power, NEW YORKER, July 3, 2006, at 44, 52.
33. Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism § i(e), 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001)
[hereinafter Military Order].
34. See, e.g., Letter from Law Professors and Lawyers to Senator Patrick J. Leahy (Dec. 5, 2001),
available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/PublicAffairs/letterleahy.pdf. Those
law professors (including this author) called "the untested institutions contemplated by the
Order... legally deficient, unnecessary, and unwise." Id. In particular, they argued that the
Order violates separation of powers, "does not comport with either constitutional or
international standards of due process," and "allows the Executive to violate the United
States' binding treaty obligations." Id. For other legal critiques of the Military Order, see, for
example, Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the
Military Tribunals, ill YALE L.J. 1259 (2002) (arguing that the Order is unconstitutional on
its face); Harold Hongju Koh, The Case Against Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 337
(2002); and George P. Fletcher, War and the Constitution: Bush's Military Tribunals Haven't
Got a Legal Leg To Stand on, AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 1, 2002, at 26.
35. Harrdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2759.
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First, the Bush Administration urged that the Court accept an
extraordinary constitutional presidential prerogative to deal with the war on
terror. 6 Second, the government claimed, in effect, that Hamdan was a person
outside the law, held in an extralegal zone (Guantinamo), who could be
subjected to the jurisdiction of a non-court. Third, the government based its
claim of authority not on any clearly delineated congressional statement but
rather upon the President's broad authority as Commander in Chief and
Congress's terse Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF).37 Fourth
and finally, the administration asserted that Hamdan, an accused enemy alien,
deserved drastically diminished rights, which could be determined in a
criminal proceeding whose rules comported with neither a prior enactment of
Congress - the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),38- nor a binding
treaty obligation -Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 .'9
Informed by an extraordinary array of amici curiae opposing the military
commission scheme, Justice Stevens's opinion for a five-Justice majority
demolished each of the government's arguments.4 ° Calling the Bush military
commissions an "extraordinary measure raising important questions about the
balance of powers in our constitutional structure," 4 the Court first rejected the
administration's extreme constitutional theory of executive power. Instead, all
the Justices who addressed the merits placed the case within the tripartite
framework of shared institutional powers set forth in Justice Jackson's
concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.42 By enacting the
36. Mayer, supra note 32, at 44 ("[T] he Administration's legal strategy for the war on terror...
(k]nown as the New Paradigm ... rests on a reading of the Constitution that few legal
scholars share-namely, that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, has the authority to
disregard virtually all previously known legal boundaries, if national security demands it.
Under this framework, statutes prohibiting torture, secret detention, and warrantless
surveillance have been set aside.").
37. Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 11S Stat. 224, 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (Supp.
III 2003)) (authorizing the President to use "all necessary and appropriate force" against
"nations, organizations, or persons" associated with the terrorist attacks of September ii,
2001, in order to protect the nation from the recurrence of such attacks).
38. 1o U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (zooo).
39. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Common Article 3].
4o. For a listing of links to twenty-nine amicus briefs opposing the government's position, see
Salim Ahmed Hamdan v. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, et al.: Supreme Court
Files, http ://www.hamdanvrumsfeld.con/briefs (last visited Aug. 30, 2006).
41. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2759 (2006).
42. 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). As the Court noted in footnote twenty-
three of its opinion, "Whether or not the President has independent power, absent
congressional authorization, to convene military commissions, he may not disregard
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Uniform Code of Military Justice, the Court reasoned, Congress had
authorized the President to use commissions but had specified that, wherever
practicable, the executive must follow the same procedural rules in military
commissions as are applied in ordinary courts-martial.43 Accordingly, the
majority placed this case within the third Youngstown category, in which "the
President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of
Congress."'
Significantly, the Court refused to accept the government's core premise
that a new "crisis paradigm" required that ordinary legal rules be jettisoned. As
Justice Kennedy put it, "[A] case that may be of extraordinary importance is
resolved by ordinary rules .. pertaining to the authority of Congress and the
interpretation of its enactments."4" Rather than embracing ad hoc, crisis
solutions, he argued, "[r]espect for laws derived from the customary operation
of the Executive and Legislative Branches gives some assurance of stability in
time of crisis. The Constitution is best preserved by reliance on standards
tested over time and insulated from the pressures of the moment.", 6 As
important, the Court rejected the government's attempted dichotomy between
law and war by requiring consistent application of the law of war to Hamdan's
case. As Justice Kennedy noted tersely, "If the military commission at issue is
illegal under the law of war, then an offender cannot be tried 'by the law of
war' before that commission."47
limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on his
powers." Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774 n.23 (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J.,
concurring)); see also id. at 2800 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The proper framework for
assessing whether Executive actions are authorized is the three-part scheme used by Justice
Jackson in his opinion in Youngstown."). Justice Thomas's dissent also began by invoking
the Youngstown framework but argued that implicit congressional authorization of the
military commissions placed this case into Category One. Id. at 2824-25 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
43. "Without for one moment underestimating [the danger posed by international terrorism], it
is not evident to us why it should require, in the case of Hamdan's trial, any variance from
the rules that govern courts-martial." Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2792.
44. 343 U.S. at 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
45. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2799 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
46. Id.; see also id. ("Where a statute provides the conditions for the exercise of governmental
power, its requirements are the result of a deliberative and reflective process engaging both
of the political branches.").
47. Id. at 2802; see also id. at 2794 (majority opinion) ("For, regardless of the nature of the rights
conferred on Hamdan, they are, as the Government does not dispute, part of the law of war.
And compliance with the law of war is the condition upon which the authority set forth in
Article 21 [of the UCMJ] is granted.") (internal citations omitted).
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Second, the Court followed its earlier insistence in Rasul v. Bush 8 that
Guantinamo be treated as a land subject to law and rejected the
administration's attempt to depict Hamdan as a person outside the law. Even
while acknowledging that Hamdan might be a terrorist who had committed
serious crimes, the Court nevertheless proclaimed that "in undertaking to try
Hamdan and subject him to criminal punishment, the executive is bound to
comply with the Rule of Law that prevails in this jurisdiction."49
Third, given the individual liberties at stake, the Court demanded a clear
congressional statement before the Commander in Chief could try even a
suspected alien terrorist before a special military commission."0 As Justice
Breyer wrote in his concurrence for four Justices, "The Court's conclusion
ultimately rests upon a single ground: Congress has not issued the Executive a
'blank check.' ''. In demanding such clear legislative authorization, the Court
followed a critically important line of cases holding that, even in times of war
or national crisis, the executive branch may not deprive suspected enemies of
their rights absent explicit congressional approval.5 2
Fourth, a majority of the Court denied the government's claim that enemy
aliens could never enforce the Geneva Conventions in U.S. courts, reasoning
that Hamdan's proposed trial violated Common Article 3 of those Conventions,
which prohibits "the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples." 3 By so saying, the majority both took note of the treaty's
48. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
49. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2798.
so. See id. at 2772 (citing a "duty which rests on the courts, in time of war as well as in time of
peace, to preserve unimpaired the constitutional safeguards of civil liberty" (quoting Ex
Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 19 (1942))).
s. Id. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U. S. 507, 536 (2004)
(plurality opinion)).
52. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (rejecting a State Department effort to deny a
passport to a Communist during the Cold War because of the absence of a clear
congressional statement denying passports based on political convictions); see also Duncan
v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946) (blocking the executive branch from using military
tribunals to try civilians in Hawaii during World War II because there was no clear
authorizing congressional statement); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139-40 (1866)
(Chase, C.J., concurring) ("[N]or can the President, or any commander under him, without
the sanction of Congress, institute tribunals for the trial and punishment of offences, either
of soldiers or civilians, unless in cases of a controlling necessity .... ).
53. Common Article 3, supra note 39. Justice Kennedy joined the key part of the majority's
opinion regarding applicability of Common Article 3, and his concurring opinion not only
referred to Common Article 3 as "part of a treaty the United States has ratified and thus
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intention to be applied universally, not selectively, and confirmed that
Congress had effectively internalized Common Article 3 into domestic law
when it enacted the UCMJ."4
In Hamdan, the Supreme Court has given us a Youngstown for the twenty-
first century. The decision resoundingly rejected the four tenets of the Bush
Administration's constitutional vision of the war against terror. Instead the
Court reaffirmed the core tenet of what I have called "The National Security
Constitution": the notion that constitutional checks and balances do not stop
at the water's edge."5 The ruling confirms that a democracy must fight even a
shadowy war on terror through balanced institutional participation: led by an
energetic executive but guided by an engaged Congress and overseen by a
skeptical judicial branch.
Hamdan reaffirms, at a critical moment in our history, that the
Constitution places clear limits on the President's capacity to act unilaterally in
national security and foreign affairs. At base, this principle recognizes that
interbranch dialogue, and not presidential unilateralism, is the best way to
develop a sustained democratic response to external crisis. In Justice Breyer's
memorable words:
Where, as here, no emergency prevents consultation with Congress,
judicial insistence upon that consultation does not weaken our Nation's
ability to deal with danger. To the contrary, that insistence strengthens
the Nation's ability to determine- through democratic means-how
best to do so. The Constitution places its faith in those democratic
means. Our Court today simply does the same.
6
accepted as binding law" but also noted that Congress has made "violations of Common
Article 3 • . . 'war crimes,' punishable as federal offenses, when committed by or against
United States nationals and military personnel." Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2802 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000)).
54. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2796 ("[Tlhe commentaries also make clear 'that the scope of the
Article must be as wide as possible.' In fact, limiting language that would have rendered
Common Article 3 applicable 'especially (to] cases of civil war, colonial conflicts, or wars of
religion,' was omitted from the final version of the Article, which coupled broader scope of
application with a narrower range of rights than did earlier proposed iterations.") (internal
citations omitted). For discussion of internalization of international into domestic law, see
generally Harold Hongju Koh, Bringing International Law Home, 35 Hous. L. REv. 623
(1998).
S5. KOH, supra note io, at 153-84.
56. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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Some commentators have tried to cabin Hamdan as narrowly concerned
with military commissions.' But to paraphrase Justice Frankfurter, Hamdan
did not just decide a particular case: "It overruled a particular way of looking at
law... [whose] inadequacies had been laid bare. '' , 8 What makes Hamdan the
most important case on executive power decided since Youngstown is not just
what it says about military commissions but more fundamentally what it says
about how the Constitution requires the President, Congress, and the courts to
work together to deal with national crises.
When the President is conducting a war on terror, Hamdan instructs, he
ought not go it alone, citing a broad constitutional theory and statutes that do
not give him specific authorization. Rather, he should seek to fit his actions
within the scope of enacted laws, such as the UCMJ, and ratified treaties, such
as Common Article 3. By so saying, Hamdan not only gives broad direction on
how a war on terror may be constitutionally conducted but also disproves
exorbitant claims already made during that war regarding the President's
supposed freedom to authorize torture and cruel treatment and to carry out
widespread warrantless domestic wiretapping in the face of contrary statutes.5 9
With respect to torture and cruel treatment, Hamdan confirms that the
President must act within the scope of a specific statute (in this case, the
McCain Amendment) and treaty (in this case, Common Article 3), or his
actions will likely be invalidated under Youngstown Category Three.6 °
According to a longstanding canon of statutory construction, courts must
construe statutes, absent clear congressional intent to the contrary, consistently
with international law.6 1 Such a reading would interpret the McCain
Amendment- notwithstanding any presidential signing statement to the
contrary-to require the executive branch to comply with the anti-torture
57. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: Establishing a Constitutional Process: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 1ogth Cong. (2006) (statement of Theodore B. Olson, former
Solicitor General).
58. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99,101 (1945).
59. See generally Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: Establishing a Constitutional Process: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, iogth Cong. (2006) (statement of Harold Hongju Koh, Dean, Yale
Law School), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/DeansOffice/
KOHHamdanTESTIMONY.pdf.
6o. For further discussion of these issues, see generally Harold Hongju Koh, Can the President Be
Torturer in Chief., 81 IND. L.J. 1145 (2006).
61. The Charming Betsy canon has long directed that "an act of Congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains." Murray
v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (Marshall, C.J.). See
generally Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic Statutory
Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103 (1990).
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provisions of Common Article 3, which the Hamdan Court held to apply not
just to interstate armed conflicts but to the war on terror as well.62
Hamdan similarly destroys the legal case in support of the NSA's sustained
program of secret, unreviewed, warrandess electronic surveillance of American
citizens and residents. 63 On its face, the 1978 FISA-a criminal statute-
requires the executive branch to seek a warrant within three days of
commencing surveillance, or within fifteen days after a declaration of war,
which by their own admission, the administration's officials never did. The
administration claimed that the President has an implied exclusive
constitutional authority over "the means and methods of engaging the enemy,"
including the conduct of "signals intelligence" during wartime. 6' But Hamdan
obliged the President to follow the UCMJ, which similarly regulates the
"means and methods of engaging the enemy."
In addition, the administration claimed that Congress implicidy authorized
the NSA surveillance plan when it voted for the AUMF. 6s But to so read the law
would violate Hamdan by construing the AUMF to give the President a "blank
check" to engage in warrantless wiretapping of Americans on U.S. soil. To
accept that reading, one would have to conclude that in September 2001,
Congress had somehow silently approved what twenty-three years earlier, in
FISA, it had expressly criminalized.66 Hamdan thus joins a long string of
Supreme Court decisions rejecting the claim that the President may invoke his
power as Commander in Chief to disregard an act of Congress designed
62. With respect to covered persons, who after Hamdan plainly include al Qaeda detainees,
Common Article 3 prohibits "at any time and in any place whatsoever.., violence to life and
person, in particular... cruel treatment and torture [and] outrages upon personal dignity,
in particular humiliating and degrading treatment." Common Article 3, supra note 39.
63. The first district court decision to decide the issue on the merits has declared the NSA
surveillance program illegal. ACLU v. NSA, No. o6-CV-1o2o 4 , 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57338
(E.D. Mich. Aug. 17, 2oo6); see National Security Agency's Surveillance Authority II, supra note
17 (describing the illegality of the NSA program).
64. DOJ White Paper, supra note 19, at 6-1o, 28-36 (setting forth, after the fact, the
Department's analysis of the constitutionality of warrentless foreign intelligence
surveillance).
65. See id. at l0-17.
66. The Hamdan majority noted that "there is nothing in the text or legislative history of the
AUMF even hinting that Congress intended to expand or alter the authorization set forth in
Article 21 of the UCMJ." Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2775 (2006). Similarly, there
is no evidence in the AUMF hinting that Congress intended by that law silently to repeal 8
U.S.C. § 25 11(2)(f) (2ooo), which makes FISA and Title III of the Criminal Code "the
exclusive means by which [domestic] electronic surveillance... may be conducted."
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specifically to restrain executive conduct in a particular field.6 7 If anything,
such a claim of presidential power would deserve even less deference in the
context of NSA surveillance, in which Fourth Amendment values and a
criminal statutory prohibition are also at stake.68
In short, Hamdan goes a long way toward restoring the constitutional
vision that the last five years had turned upside down. By rejecting the
President's supposed freedom to try military terrorist suspects before
commissions that do not meet the standards of the UCMJ or Common Article
3, it also calls into question the President's supposed freedom to authorize
torture and cruel treatment in the face of the McCain Amendment and to
authorize warrantless domestic surveillance in the face of FISA. By so doing,
Hamdan starts the process of setting the world right. It marks a major step
toward reestablishing what Justice Jackson termed in his Youngstown
concurrence the "equilibrium established by our constitutional system."
6 9
67. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535-36 (2004) (rejecting the President's claim
that courts may not inquire into the factual basis for the detention of a U.S. citizen "enemy
combatant" and reasoning that "(w]hatever power the United States Constitution envisions
for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations in times
of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties
are at stake"); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (rejecting the President's claim that it
would be an unconstitutional interference with the President's commander in chief power to
interpret the habeas corpus statute to encompass actions filed on behalf of Guantfinamo
detainees); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 586 (1952) (invalidating
the President's seizure of the steel mills when Congress had previously "rejected an
amendment which would have authorized such governmental seizures in cases of
emergency"); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866) (holding that the executive had
violated the Habeas Corpus Act by failing to discharge from military custody a petitioner
charged, inter alia, with violation of the laws of war); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)
170 (1804) (invalidating the seizure of a ship during a conflict with France as implicitly
disapproved by Congress); United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1230 (Paterson, Circuit
Justice, C.C.D.N.Y. 18o6) (No. 16,342) ("The president of the United States cannot control
the statute, nor dispense with its execution, and still less can he authorize a person to do
what the law forbids.").
68. While the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review suggested in dictum in In re
Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 742 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. Review 2002) (per
curiam), that Congress cannot "encroach on the President's constitutional power" to
conduct foreign intelligence surveillance, the court in that case upheld FISA's
constitutionality, affirming that Congress may constitutionally regulate significant amounts
of foreign intelligence without encroaching on exclusive presidential prerogatives.
69. 343 U.S. at 638 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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IV. THE MYTHS OF "THE COMPLETION POWER" AND "RATIONAL
WAR"
Hamdan's commitments to checks and balances and the rule of law in
foreign affairs call into question not just recent executive branch arguments but
also recent legal scholarship urging the need for expanded presidential
discretion in national security affairs. Two immediate examples are
contributions to this Symposium authored by prominent executive power
advocates and former government officials. Professors John Manning and Jack
Goldsmith argue for the existence of a presidential "completion power," while
Professors Jide Nzelibe and John Yoo claim that a better constitutional design
would authorize the executive to engage in discretionary "rational war."
In a post-Hamdan world, the call of both essays for more constitutional
discretion for the executive already has a dated feel. However well intentioned
both scholarly efforts may be, both ultimately exhibit the same flaw: They
suggest constitutional myths to provide legal cover for the President's
perception that any action in which he chooses to engage must be right, simply
because he perceives the need to act.
A. A Completion Power?
Professors Goldsmith and Manning claim a "constitutional tradition"
supporting an Article II "completion power," a "distinct presidential power"
that, while defeasible by Congress's express action, resides "presumptive [ly]"
or by "default" in the executive branch.70 Using Chief Justice Vinson's
Youngstown dissent as their touchstone, Goldsmith and Manning claim that
"the President possessed a residual capacity to take the steps necessary to carry
out Congress's program, even if Congress itself had not provided for those
specific steps.""7 A completion power, they claim, finds support in post-
Youngstown case law and government practice and amounts to an interstitial,
autonomous presidential authority to fill the gaps in a statutory scheme. 72
Upon examination, their completion power is just another term for an
implied Necessary and Proper Clause for the President, a power that-
unfortunately for these authors -the Framers chose to give to Congress, not
70. Goldsmith & Manning, supra note i, at 2282, 2298, 2303.
71. Id. at 2285.
72. Id. at 2303 ("Where Congress has failed to specify in full the manner of enforcement, the
Executive necessarily exercises some discretion in specifying incidental details necessary to
carry into execution a legislative program.").
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the President. Goldsmith and Manning claim that the hypothetical completion
power empowers the President not just to fill gaps within, but actually to "go
beyond (but not against) the implemental prescriptions of particular statutes" to
engage in executive lawmaking, a power that they claim "is neither dictated nor
meaningfully channeled by legislative command. '7 While characteristically
creative, ultimately these authors' analysis founders on three shoals: the
problems of source, overgeneralization, and Hamdan.
Take first the problem of source. An executive power to fill statutory gaps
may sound benign, but under Goldsmith and Manning's logic, when the
President takes steps to complete a statutory scheme, he draws not on
delegated power from Congress but on his own reservoir of unenumerated
constitutional authority. The question, of course, is where, precisely, does that
reservoir come from?
Goldsmith and Manning suggest three possible constitutional sources for
the completion power: the Commander in Chief Clause, the Clause that vests
the "executive Power" in the President, and the President's Article II duty to
take care that the laws be faithfully executed. But as Hamdan and Youngstown
amply demonstrate, the Commander in Chief Clause has definite limits,
particularly when extended domestically and beyond the military sphere. Nor
is there substantial historical evidence that the Framers' decision to vest
"executive Power" in the President carried with it a broad unenumerated power
to conduct foreign or domestic affairs. 74 And by its own terms, the Take Care
Clause speaks in the language of a presidential duty, not a license. The
President's duty is to faithfully execute the laws that Congress enacts in a
manner consistent with congressional intent. As Professor Henkin has noted,
"The principal purport of the clause, no doubt, was that the President shall be a
loyal agent of Congress to enforce its laws."7
73. Id. at 2285, 2308 (emphasis added).
74. See, e.g., Arthur Bestor, Respective Roles of Senate and President in the Making and Abrogation of
Treaties - The Original Intent of the Framers of the Constitution Historically Examined, 55 WASH.
L. REV. 1, 31 (1979) ("No serious attempt has ever been made to show that the framers of the
Constitution accepted.., that executive power by its very nature includes control of foreign
affairs. As a matter of historical fact, the only utterances made in the Federal Convention of
1787 on the subject were emphatic rejections."); see also George Winterton, The Concept of
Extra-Constitutional Executive Power in Domestic Affairs, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 24-25 & n.
16o, 26-29 (1970) (rejecting a broad view of the Executive Power Clause).
75. Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 54 (1972); see also THE FEDERALIST
No. 70, at 451-52 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano ed., 20o0). Justice Black echoed
this view in Youngstown, noting that "the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully
executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).
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The recent constitutional debate over presidential signing statements has
raged precisely because the President has claimed an unenumerated Article II
power to interpret a statutory scheme faithfully not to Congress's intent, but
rather to his own reading of what that scheme's goals might be. 6 As Justice
Black put it in Youngstown, President Truman's order seizing the steel mills was
unlawful because it did "not direct that a congressional policy be executed in a
manner prescribed by Congress-it direct[ed] that a presidential policy be
executed in a manner prescribed by the President."77 By so doing, the
President's action crossed the line from executive action into lawmaking and
violated the separation of powers.
In a variety of contexts, Goldsmith and Manning argue, the President now
engages in precisely such interstitial lawmaking, on his own constitutional
authority. Yet strangely, Goldsmith and Manning would vindicate that use by
invoking Chief Justice Vinson's dissent in Youngstown, although that view was
rejected by six Justices in 1952 and would also, if Hamdan is any indicator, be
rejected by five Justices today.
Justice Black's majority opinion in Youngstown held that the lawmaking
power resides exclusively with Congress, unless Congress chooses to delegate
some of its authority to the executive. Because President Truman's actions in
seizing the steel mills exceeded that delegated authority, the Court held that
Truman had transgressed that legislative prerogative.7 But under Goldsmith
and Manning's logic, constitutional custom now acknowledges that the
President does have some inherent lawmaking power-which they call the
completion power -that does not derive from a delegation from Congress and
is triggered when a statute is unclear. Because this alleged power derives from
Article II, Goldsmith and Manning further claim, the executive view deserves
presumptive deference from the courts, leaving little role for meaningful
judicial oversight.
On examination, Goldsmith and Manning overgeneralize from the various
doctrinal areas they collect, which do not in fact read the President's powers as
broadly as they do. In the landmark Chevron case, 79 for example, the Court
famously held that a reviewing court must give an executive agency's
interpretation "considerable weight," but in so saying, the Court did not give
the executive a blank check to exercise discretion unrooted in legislative
76. See generally ABA TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE SEPARATION
OF PowERs DOCTRINE, TASK FORCE REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS (2006), available at
http://www.abanet.org/op/signingstatements.
77. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 588.
78. Id. at 589.
79. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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intent.8' The Court said, "If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to
fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific
provision of the statute by regulation."8' In other words, the authority belongs
to Congress in the first place, and only when Congress has acted by delegating
that authority to the President does the executive gain the power to act.
Nor does Goldsmith and Manning's vision of a constrained role for judicial
review of such executive actions in foreign affairs seem plausible after the
Court's decision in Hamdan. The authors cite the Court's decision upholding
State Department travel restrictions to Cuba in Zemel v. Rusks2 without
substantially addressing Kent v. Dulles,8 3 which directed judges to find a clear
legislative statement that Congress has authorized the executive act in question
before condoning an executive infringement upon individual rights. 84 As noted
above, Hamdan refused to read the AUMF to give the Bush Administration a
"blank check" to conduct military commissions inconsistent with the UCMJ.
Nor did the Justices in Hamdan read Loving v. United States,8" as the authors
would, to recognize the President's power to supplement the UCMJ with his
"independent constitutional authority to determine the conditions of
punishments imposed by military trials., ' 6 Instead, the Hamdan majority
so. Under Chevron, the agency's interpretation is given "considerable weight," but first the
reviewing court must find that the agency's policy choice could be "a reasonable policy
choice for the agency to make." Id. at 844-45.
81. Id. at 843-44 (emphasis added). Moreover, Chevron only directs that the executive may fill in
a congressional statutory framework if Congress leaves a gap that forces the executive, when
implementing the statute, to choose among "competing interests." Id. at 865; see aLso id. at
845 ("If this choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were
committed to the agency's care by the statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears
from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress
would have sanctioned." (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382-83 (1961))).
Significantly, Goldsmith and Manning read Chevron as giving the executive broad freedom
to resolve statutory "ambiguities," not just to resolve conflicting interests, thereby giving the
executive many more opportunities to act when legislative direction is unclear. See
Goldsmith & Manning, supra note i, at 2298-99.
82. 381 U.S. 1 (1965); see also Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242 (1984) ("Our holding in Zemel
was merely an example of this classical deference to the political branches in matters of
foreign policy.").
83. 357 U.S. 116 (1958). But see Goldsmith & Manning, supra note i, at 2289 n.37 ("Kent does not
deny a completion power.").
84. See Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 1, at 2888-89.
85. 517 U.S. 748 (1996).
86. Goldsmith & Manning, supra note i, at 2290. To the contrary, Justice Stevens's plurality
opinion cites Loving for the proposition that
[w]hen . . . neither the elements of the offense nor the range of permissible
punishments is defined by statute or treaty, the precedent must be plain and
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effectively demanded a clear legislative statement, reflecting the simple,
democratic principle that executive rules regulating individual rights should
"reflect the political consent and public participation embodied in legislation,
rather than the self-interested bureaucratic discretion that is likely to be the
character of executive action.
8
1
Similarly, the authors overread Dames & Moore v. Regan88 as endorsing
broad presidential authority in foreign affairs to "complet[e] a congressional
scheme by taking an action that was only loosely related to the scheme." 89 In
Hamdan, the President claimed, in effect, an unenumerated power to complete
the military commission scheme envisioned by the UCMJ to cover trials of
suspected terrorists. Yet that is precisely the unspecified executive power that
the Hamdan Court rejected, citing Justice Jackson's concurrence in
Youngstown.9" Similarly, Dames & Moore relied not on Chief Justice Vinson's
Youngstown dissent but on Justice Jackson's concurrence, a fact that Goldsmith
and Manning nowhere mention.9
It is true, as I have argued elsewhere, that Dames & Moore diluted the
Youngstown vision of balanced institutional participation in the national
security process by making it "easier to find congressional approval and more
difficult for Congress to express its institutional opposition ... simultaneously
strengthen[ing] the President vis- -vis the courts by effectively requiring them
to apply special deference to executive acts in foreign affairs." '92 But Hamdan's
unambiguous. To demand any less would be to risk concentrating in military
hands a degree of adjudicative and punitive power in excess of that contemplated
either by statute or by the Constitution.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 278o (20o6) (plurality opinion) (citing Loving, 517
U.S. at 771); cf id. at 28oo (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Loving, 517 U.S. at 756-58, 76o,
for the proposition that military commissions, like courts "[1]ocated within a single branch,
... carry the risk that offenses will be defined, prosecuted, and adjudicated by executive
officials without independent review").
87. Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Curtiss-Wright Comes Home: Executive Power and
National Security Secrecy, 21 I-IARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 349, 355-56 (1986).
88. 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981).
8g. Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 1, at 2289.
go. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774 n.23 ("Whether or not the President has independent power,
absent congressional authorization, to convene military commissions, he may not disregard
limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on his
powers." (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring))); see also id. at 2800 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
91. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 661 (noting that Justice Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown
"brings together as much combination of analysis and common sense as there is in this
area").
92. KOH, supra note to, at 142.
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reasoning makes it less likely that future courts will automatically apply special
deference in foreign affairs and more likely that courts will find limitations
upon independent executive action in detailed congressional prescriptions. In
short, the entire thrust of the Hamlan ruling runs contrary to Goldsmith and
Manning's image of a self-contained completion power that is subject to only
minimal checks by the other branches of government.
In the end, Goldsmith and Manning seem unduly driven by an impulse for
intellectual tidiness-a desire to bead together disparate doctrinal areas into a
single charm bracelet they label the "completion power." Nowhere do they
justify their core premise: why we need to lend "conceptual coherence to
several important areas of executive authority whose connection has not
previously been understood."93 Is positing the existence of an unenumerated
reservoir called the completion power really necessary to make sense of the
executive's actions in these disparate areas?
A number of scholars have posited a theory of the "unitary executive," the
notion that the President has independent power to control the executive
branch and to resist infringements upon the prerogatives of his office. 94 But
the Constitution provides no single source for the President's various abilities
to promulgate agency regulations, to exercise prosecutorial discretion, and to
conduct foreign relations. As Justice Jackson famously wrote in his Youngstown
concurrence, "Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending on
their disjunction . . . with those of Congress." ' The very point of a
constitutional system of checks and balances is to separate and divide powers
and to foster internal checks within each branch by recognizing multiple
sources of enumerated authority operating in a number of different subject
matter areas. The genius of Justice Jackson's Youngstown analysis rests in its
acknowledgement of multiple sources of executive power, rather than implying
that all executive actions automatically enjoy heightened deference because
they spring from a wellspring of a completion power located somewhere in
Article II.
At bottom, Hamdan proves again that Justice Jackson's tripartite structure
in Youngstown is sufficiently flexible to permit robust executive action when
Congress genuinely approves, while constraining executive action against the
will of Congress. In the end, Justice Jackson's classic analysis of executive
93. Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 1, at 2282.
94. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 1o5 HAv. L. REV. 1553 (1992); see also Steven G. Calabresi, Some
Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23 (1995).
95. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J, concurring).
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power much better explains the doctrinal pockets that Goldsmith and Manning
discuss than does their newly minted theory of an Article II completion power.
B. Should the Constitution Be Read To Permit "Rational War"?
Even more wrong-headed -and irreconcilable with the spirit of Hamdan-
is Professors Nzelibe and Yoo's suggestion that congressional participation in
the process of deciding whether to go to war is "unwise to establish as a
constitutional rule." 96 One might think that more than two centuries of
congressional participation in the decision to declare and regulate war had
settled what was textually established at the Founding in Article I, Section 8 of
the Constitution. 97 Nevertheless, the authors simply assert that presidential
primacy in warmaking has become the "status quo" and then proceed to offer
three "functional reasons" -accountability, expertise and accuracy, and
international factors-why this de facto primacy should be treated as a better
constitutional design.
The authors claim that Presidents are more accountable than Congress
because they "will bear the lion's share of the electoral consequences of victory
or defeat in war" and therefore will be more responsive to the sentiments of the
country. 8 With respect to expertise and accuracy, they contend that
congressional involvement does not necessarily produce better outcomes,
measured in terms of more worthy wars won and more unwise wars avoided.
While they acknowledge that congressional involvement in warmaking
decisions might be desirable in signaling to democratic nations, they suggest
that nonstate actors or rogue states do not respond to signals. Thus, they
suggest, "a two-tier approach to war powers might be desirable, in which
96. Nzelibe & Yoo, supra note 1, at 2541.
97. As the Court's opinion in Hamdan notes:
The Constitution makes the President the "Commander in Chief' of the Armed
Forces, Art. II, §2, cl. 1, but vests in Congress the powers to "declare War... and
make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water," Art. I, §8, cl. 11, to "raise
and support Armies," id., cl. 12, to "define and punish ... Offences against the
Law of Nations," id., cl. io, and "To make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces," id., cl. 14. The interplay between these
powers was described . .. in . . . Ex parte Milligan: "The power to make the
necessary laws is in Congress; the power to execute in the President.... But
neither can the President, in war more than in peace, intrude upon the proper
authority of Congress ......
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2773 (2006) (quoting Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 2, 139 (1866) (Chase, C.J., concurring)).
98. Nzelibe & Yoo, supra note i, at 2520.
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conflicts with similar nation-states should involve congressional
authorization," but conflicts with nonstate actors or nondemocratic regimes
might not.9 9 These functional reasons, they claim, suggest that a rational
constitutional design would leave the decision to go to war in the hands of the
President, who should have complete discretion over whether to allow
Congress to play its assigned constitutional role in that pressing national
decision.1 ° ° Courts, they also suggest, should be wholly excluded from this
process, because "judicial review would likely undermine the value of signals
sent by the President when he seeks legislative authorization to go to war," and
"preclude the possibility of beneficial bargaining between the President and
Congress by forcing warmaking into a procedural straitjacket."
10 1
On reflection, Nzelibe and Yoo's analysis is rebutted both by Hamdan and
by the current war in Iraq. As noted above, Hamdan's reasoning rebuffs the
extreme theory of unilateral presidential power that pervades Professor Yoo's
academic and government work. °2 The authors would dismiss Hamdan as
dealing only with military commissions, "simply fail[ing] to see how [the
Hamdan] decision is relevant to understanding how the political branches
should interact when deciding to initiate the use of force.""1 3 Yet as I have
argued elsewhere, the Constitution's warmaking provisions envision a political
procedure "in which decisions to make war are preceded by intrabranch debate
and deliberation, interbranch dialogue, and the creation and delineation of
institutional precedent."' 4 Hamdan strongly supports that traditional political
99. Id. at 2536.
loo. The authors do concede that "[e]ven under the strongest President-first theories, Congress
still retains the ability to check presidential foreign policy and national security decisions
through the funding power." Id. at 2521.
lo. Id. at 2537.
io2. See generally JOHN Yoo, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005). As an attorney at the Office of Legal Counsel, Professor Yoo was
also an architect of the infamous August 2002 "Torture Opinion," the legal decision
supporting NSA spying, and the legal conclusion- now rejected by Hamdan-that Common
Article 3 does not apply to detainees in the war on terror. See Dan Eggen, Bush Authorized
Domestic Spying, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2oo5, at Ai (spying); David Johnston & Neil A.
Lewis, Bush's Counsel Sought Ruling About Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2005, at Al (torture);
Michael Isikoff, Double Standards?, NEWSWEEK, May 25, 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.
con/id/5o 32094/site/newsweek (Common Article 3).
103. Nzelibe & Yoo, supra note 1, at 2539.
104. Harold Hongju Koh, War and Responsibility in the Dole-Gingrich Congress, 50 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 1, 8 (1995); see also id. ("[In Operation Desert Storm] both the executive and legislative
branches engaged in lengthy intrabranch deliberation before ultimately committing to war,
an interbranch dialogue ensued that culminated in the congressional resolution authorizing
use of force in Iraq, and the episode helped delineate an important institutional precedent
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dynamic, clarifying that the Constitution views interbranch dialogue,
promoted through litigation if necessary, as the best way to develop a sustained
democratic response to external crisis."' 5
Remarkably, the authors suggest that recent setbacks in the Iraq War
support their case, by disproving a positive correlation "between ex ante
statutory authorization and American success" on the battlefield. ' °6 In Iraq,
they claim, prior congressional deliberation about entering a war failed to
produce a sense of public buy-in and lasting support for the war effort. Nor did
the "inclusion of Congress, ex ante, in the decision to use force... lead to any
greater accuracy in decision-making," they claim, because "Congress brought
no independent collection or analysis of information to bear" on the decision.1
7
Nzelibe and Yoo acknowledge that Congress's "decision to authorize the use of
force against Iraq [was based on] on the intelligence and analysis presented by
the Bush Administration," which falsely, it turned out, reported the existence
of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.10 s Thus, Iraq is an exceedingly poor
example to support their claim that the executive can better gather accurate
information than Congress because it was not Congress's intelligence-
gathering process, but the executive's own National Intelligence Estimate, that
proved fatally flawed. To cite the latest Iraq War as a reason to dispense with
congressional participation in warmaking decisions would reward the executive
for secrecy or presentation of false or misleading information and relieve the
executive from any obligation to subject its war justifications and plans to
rigorous public scrutiny.
Nzelibe and Yoo also argue that by acting as a natural brake on going to
war, congressional participation might also cause "errors of omission," namely,
wars we should rationally have fought but did not."9 But again, their claim
that a President can more rationally choose to engage in war assumes that the
executive branch is better able than Congress to weigh the likely costs and
benefits of going to war. In fact, Iraq provides a devastating counterexample.
which has served as a touchstone for subsequent deliberations."); Harold Hongju Koh,
Presidential War and Congressional Consent: The Law Professors' Memorandum in Dellums v.
Bush, 27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 247 (1991) (outlining the constitutional argument for
congressional consent prior to the invasion of Iraq in the Persian Gulf War).
105. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring).
1o6. Nzelibe & Yoo, supra note 1, at 2525.
107. Id. at 2524.
io8. Id. See generally JAMES RISEN, STATE OF WAR: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE CIA AND THE
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 109 (2006) ("[I]n fact, many CIA officials ... knew before the war
that they lacked sufficient evidence to make the case for the existence of Iraq's weapons
programs.").
iog. Nzelibe & Yoo, supra note i, at 2517-18.
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As one recent account has made clear, the current Iraq occupation "was made
possible only through the [executive's] intellectual acrobatics of simultaneously
'worst-casing' the threat posed by Iraq, even while 'best-casing' the subsequent
cost and difficulty of occupying the country." ' In January 2003, for example,
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld projected the cost of waging the war as "a
number that's something under $5o billion"; only three years later, Nobel
Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz projected the likely actual cost to be
between $1 and 2 trillion.'11
The final part of Nzelibe and Yoo's analysis seeks to mix the "democratic
peace" literature from political science with signaling theory drawn from
rational choice theory to argue that legislative authorization raises the costs of
sending threatening signals to other nations. Their argument calls for an
unworkable rule allowing higher levels of ex ante congressional participation
for going to war with democracies (which, of course, the United States never
does) than for waging war upon autocratic governments and nonstate actors.
Stripped of the obfuscating techno-speak, their "rational" constitutional system
for going to war would give the President complete discretion to dispense with
congressional participation, so long as he is waging war against terrorists and
dictators.
This claim makes little sense. Why should a dictator such as Kim Jong I1 or
a terrorist leader like Osama bin Laden have more difficulty understanding
signals of war than complex parliamentary democracies? Shouldn't signaling
theory take account as well of the domestic signal that a declaration of war or
authorization for use of force resolution sends to the warmaking country's own
citizens about the possible consequences of being at war? Most fundamentally,
Nzelibe and Yoo's suggestion flatly violates the spirit of the Constitution by
speeding, not slowing, the march to war. As James Wilson made clear during
the constitutional debates, the current constitutional design was intended so
that "[t] his system will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against
it. It will not be in the power of a single man... to involve us in such distress;
for the important power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large.... 2
As then-Congressman Abraham Lincoln noted in 1848, unilateral presidential
warmaking rivals "the most oppressive of all Kingly oppressions" that the
11o. THOMAS E. RICKS, FiAsco: THE AMERICAN MILITARYADVENTURE IN IRAQ4 (2006).
ill. Martin Wolk, Cost of Iraq War Could Surpass $i Trillion, MSNBC.coM, Mar. 17, 2006,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/1188o954.
il1. 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 528 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1891).
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Framers sought to suppress." 3 Taken seriously, the authors' theory would
essentially oust Congress from any decision to go to war, except for the most
limited ex post involvement by the politically difficult means of controlling
funding after troops were already committed.
Nzelibe and Yoo mischaracterize my view as a "pure Congress-first
approach,"11 4 as opposed to what it really is: an approach guided by the
Constitution's requirement that all three branches of government meaningfully
participate in significant warmaking decisions. Claiming that institutional
incentives make it unlikely that Congress will restrain the President, they
suggest that we must bow to political reality and reframe the Constitution to
give the President greater freedom to go to war. Coming from these authors,
this suggestion is hardly surprising. In the last five years, with regard to issues
ranging from the Torture Memo to NSA spying to Common Article 3,
Professor Yoo has repeatedly called for "more realistic" normative
frameworks," 5 then ended up justifying policies that are not just
anticonstitutional, but that have caused far more problems than they have
solved. This latest call for greater presidential unilateralism in warmaking is no
exception.
No one denies that the current legislative framework within which
warmaking decisions are made could be significantly improved."6 But the need
for new and improved legislation does not render obsolete our current
constitutional scheme for warmaking. That scheme rests on a simple,
compelling logic: that before the President sends American soldiers out to fight
and die, he must both consult with and convince elected officials who do not
work for him. Dispensing with that commonsense requirement-as Nzelibe
and Yoo would effectively do-furthers neither rational warmaking nor
constitutional design.
113. THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 44 (Richard N. Current ed., 1967); see also
United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1231 (Paterson, Circuit Justice, C.C.D.N.Y. 18o6)
(No. 16,342) (noting that if constitutionally authorized to do more than repel sudden
attacks, the President could, "contrary to the constitutional will.., involve the nation.., in
all the calamities of a long and expensive war").
114. Nzelibe & Yoo, supra note 1, at 2541.
115. E.g., Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Statehood and the Third Geneva Convention, 46 VA. J.
INT'L L. 131,157-58 (2005).
116. See generally JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF
VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993); KOH, supra note lo, at 189-93 (suggesting reforms of
the War Powers Resolution); Leslie H. Gelb & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Declare War,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 2005, at 54.
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CONCLUSION
Global crises make bad law. September 11 turned public law upside down.
Thankfully, Hamdan has begun to turn it right-side up again. But for that
restoration to succeed, we cannot be misled by unfounded claims that the
executive constitutes a law unto itself. Once that claim becomes the
constitutional formula for dealing with danger, the executive itself soon
becomes the most dangerous branch.
Hamdan recognized what too many commentators and academics have
misunderstood: that every new political crisis does not demand a new
constitutional paradigm. In a war on terror, all three branches of government
must continue to play their constitutionally assigned roles. Even the critical
importance of maintaining "energy in the executive" in a time of terror cannot
justify rewriting the Constitution to endorse unchecked executive power.
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